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The CFrA required the Parties to establish a formal Working Group to address
the issue of harmonization and provided that fuilure to implement a new regime within seven
years would allow either Party to tenninate the Agreement. (CFTA Article 1906) NAFI'A is
less stringent, simply requiring the Parties to consider the "potential" to develop substitute
measures. (NAFTA Article 1907-2).

When teaching "corporations," have you ever felt that there was a larger than
usual disparity between the subject as taught and the probable future experiences of
our students? The classic features of a corporation-limited liability, perpetual
duration, ease of transferability of interest, and centralized management, seem so
remote from the intimate, close corporations many of our students are likely to deal
with.
After graduation, A Abbie, in the front row, B. Benny, who sits behind her and
C. Cindy in the back, may fonn "ABC Cookie Corp.", to exploit C. Cindy's recipe for
chocolate chip cookies. They will invest their life's savings, devote all of their time and
efforts to the success of the ventW'e, and dream of lifetimes of happy employment
including handsome compensation packages, bonuses and benefits. They may even
look forward to the day they will sell their interests, retire to Hawaii and be
remembered as the latest incarnations of"Famous Amos."
They will each be shareholders, board members, and officers. They will
probably not conduct regular board meetings, have annual shareholder's meetings,
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keep minutes, nor observe any but the minimum corporate fonnalities; and those only
when threatened by their lawyer or accountant
To these three individuals, the classic C9IJ)Otate features we taught them are
mostly irrelevant. As to perpetual duration, they know that they can dissolve the
corporation at any time and, if they are not good corporate citizens, the state may
dissolve it for them. As to ease of transferability of their interests, they are concerned
with the opposite-restricting the transfer of shares, and they will probably execute a
shareholder's agreement to that effect. As to centralized management, they each have
the powers and rights of shareholders, officers and directors, but are not really sure
what the differences are, or why they exist, because they do everything together
anyway.
A. Abbie, B. Benny and C. Cindy probably consider themselves to be
"partners." The corporate form of business may have been selected only for its
supPosed insulation from personal liability. But even that attribute is mostly
imaginary today in matters of contract liability to lending institutions, landlords and
major vendors, due to the routine requirement of personal guarantees.
ABC Cookie Corp. may operate hannoniously for years, with the individuals
making all business decisions by persuasion of the majority. When, however, A
Abbie and B. Benny get married, and pool their interests to consistently polarize the
two of them on one side of each issue and C. Cindy on the other, C. Cindy could
suffer dramatically. Now, governance by the majority means that C. Cindy has no
effective voice. If the relationship deteriorates to the point that C. Cindy is no longer
able or allowed to participate in the business of the corporation, she may experience
the loss of her employment, the loss of her compensation, the loss of any return on her
investment and the loss of all of her reasonable expectations for her future. A bad
novelist might say that "all of her dreams were shattered."
Just as we, as instructors, sense that most of our students will not become
CEO's of large, publicly traded corporations (and that, therefore, lectures relating
exclusively to such corporations may not be entirely relevant to their business future),
the legislature and the courts of the State of New York have aclmowledged that
shareholders in close corporations have special needs. 1
New Yorlc recognizes the practical difference between being a shareholder in a
large publicly held corporation and being a shareholder in a close corporation,
particularly in instances of shareholder oppression. All shareholders may pursue the
traditional remedies of direct or derivative actions against the corporation and the
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board of directors to remedy perceived wrongs. Shareholders in publicly traded
corporations also have the ability to become instantly liquid. The aggrieved
shareholder can dispose of his or her shares by selling them for market value through a
stock exchange or stock market transaction. To shareholders in a close corporation,
instant liquidity may not be available and the other remedies may not be practical.
This paper discusses the statutory cause of action for "oppression" by the corporate
majority against the minority, what behaviors constitute oppression and two defenses
recently raised by a defendant-majority shareholder in an oppression case in New
York County.
A Cause OfAction For Oppression

The New York legislature, in 1979, reacting to section 97 of the ABA-ALI
Model Business Corporation Act (1972 ed.) and to the statutes already passed in
twelve other states,2 adopted Business Corporation Law section 1104-a3 to afford
certain protections to minority shareholders, in closely held corporations, who were
oppressed by the majority.
BCL section 1104-a (and its corollary, BCL section 1118t" ... created
remedies for minority shareholders of close corporations and may be considered
legislative recognition of the fact that the relationships among shareholders of such
offers to
corporations closely approximated that among partners."5 Section
minority shareholders of close corporations the weighty remedy of involuntary
dissolutiott It provides, in relevant part:
"The holders of twenty percent or more of all outstanding
shares of a co.rporation...no shares of which are listed on a national
securities exchange or regularly quoted in an over-the-col.IDter
market. ..who are entitled to vote in an election of directors may present
a petition of dissolution on one or more of the following grounds: (I)
The directors or those in control of the corporation may have been
guilty of illegal, fraudulent or oppressive actions toward the minority
shareholders ... "6
"Oppression" is not defined in the BCL. Professor F. Hodge O'Neal, an
authority on "squeeze-<Juts" of minority shareholders, formulared a test for
"oppression" which was included in the legislative materials of the statute's cosponsors
in 1979.7 In describing the need for such a iest, Professor O'Neal stated:
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"Many participants in closely held corporations are 'little
people,' unsophisticated in business and financial matters. Not
uncommonly a participant in a closely held enterprise invests all his
assets in the business with an expectation. often reasonable under the
circumstances even in the absence of an express contract, that he will be
a key employee in the company and will have a voice in business
decisions."8
The "reasonable expectations" test has been the benchmark for determining
oppressive actions from the first New York case, in 1980, to deal with BCL section
I104-a,9 and has been described as follows: A shareholder who reasonably expected
that ownership in the corporation would entitle him or her to a job, a share of
corporate earnings, a place in corporate management, or some other fonn of security,
would be oppressed in a very real sense when others in the corporation seek to defeat
10
those expectations and there is no effective means of salvaging the investment.
In the seminal case of In the Matter ofTooner.11 the Court found "oppression"
by the controlling shareholder, based on the following facts: "...[B}usiness...flourished
in the brief one-year period during most of which Petitioner Topper has actively
participated," 12 " •••Petitioner Topper associated himself with [the other two
shareholders and the corporations] in the expectation of being an active
14
parti.cipant...,'' 13 "Petitioner put his life savings into the venture." [Petitioner]
15
" ... [T]he
executed personal guaranties..."
majority
shareholders...discharged
petitioner as an employee, tenninated his salary...removed him as an officer...and
changed the locks on the corporate offices to exclude him." 16

The Court held, based on the foregoing facts: "... [R]espondent's actions have
severely damaged petitioner's reasonable expectations and constitute a freeze-out of
petitioner's interest; consequently, they are deemed to be 'oppressive' within the
statut01y framework." 17
Since the Topper decision, the courts of New York have consistently found
"oppression" within the meaning of BCL section 1104-a by application of the
"reasonable expectations" test. Jvfinority shareholders have been granted relief from
the oppression of the majority in the following circumstances:
• Petitioner, a thirty-five percent shareholder, was expelled from any role in the
and removed as an officer and a director. 18

• Petitioner, a one-third shareholder with two other shareholders, was frozen
out of active operations of the corporation. There existed no shareholder's or any other
written agreement with respect to the operation of the corporation. there were no
bylaws and many organizational formalities were ignored. 19
• Petitioners, both long tenn employees (one for forty-two years, the other for
thirty-six years) had invested capital in the corporation. After leaving. they were
"frozen out" Their experience had been that when with the company they received
distributions of the company's earnings. After they left, they received nothing. The
court held: " When the majority shareholders of a close coxporation award de facto
dividends to all shareholders except a class of minority shareholders, such a policy
may constitute 'oppressive actions' ..."20
• Petitioner, actively engaged in family business, was discharged as an officer
and employee (of all the family · corporations), locked out of the building and
threatened with criminal prosecution if he trespassed on any of the corporate
properties.21
• Petitioner joined the corporate venture pursuant to an tmderstanding that he
would be provided with salaried employment to continue as long as the corporation
existed; bis salary was terminated. 22
• Petitioner-employee, a twenty·five percent shareholder and employee of a
family-owned corporation was terminated, was denied entry to the corporate office by
use ofa padlock and was denied further salary and
• Petitioner, a one-third shareholder and employee, was suspected of: expense
account irregularities, making generous "gifts" to clients, double-billing the
corporation for the same expense, holding himself out to be the president (which he
was not), and engaging in a side business (which may or may not have been in
competition with the corporation). He was tenninated, the locks were changed, he
4
was removed as an officer and director?
In all of the foregoing illustrations, the common theme was the conduct of the
majority that substanti.ally defeated the expectations of the minority that were
reasonable under the circwnstances. The disappoinunent of the minority shareholders
constituted oppression.zs
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Dissolution Or Buv-out
Section 1104-a, by its tetmS, affords the "oppressed" shareholder with a cause
of action for involuntary dissolution. This may or may not be a satisfactory remedy
under the particular circwnstances. However, when the oppressed nrinority
shareholder combines the threat of dissolution with BCL section 1118, a weapon of
26
substantial practical utility is created.
That section provides a court sanctioned
mechanism for dispute resolution far broader than an order for dissolution alone. In all
but the most unusual circumstances, the minority shareholder wants to be free from the
oppressive majority, to cash out, and to be able to invest and work elsewbez:. The
statutory remedy of dissolution under section 1104-a alone, may not proVlde the
shareholder with the means or the opportunity to pursue his or her chosen career. The
lawsuit may continue for years, and the book value of the shares may decrease durin?
the process of litigation due to the distraction ofmanagement and the costs involved.2
Section 1118, entitled "Purchase of petitioner's shares; valuation.", provides in
relevant part:
"(a) In any proceeding brought pursuant to section eleven
of this chapter, any other shareholder or shareholders or
hundred
the corporation may, at any time within ninety days after the filing of
such petition or at such later time as the court in its discretion may
allow, elect to purchase the shares owp.ed by the petitioners at their fair
value and upon such terms and conditions as may be approved by the
court. (b) If one or more shareholders or the corporation elect to
purchase the shares owned by the petitioner but are unable to agree with
the petitioner upon the fair value of such shares, the court, upon the
application of such prospective purchaser or purchasers, or the
petitioner may stay the proceedings brought by pursuant to section
11 04-a of this chapter and determine the fair value of the petitioner's
shares as of the day prior to the date on which such petition was filed,
exclusive of any element of value arising from such filing ... "

The result of these two sections, 1104-a and 1118, is to provide the oppressed
minority shareholder with more than just a remedy for involuntary dissolution.
Together, they give the shareholder the power to negotiate, with judicial imprimatur, to
cause the majority to seriously consider buying out the minority. Failure to do so
raises the possibility of forced dissolution or forced purchase of the minority shares,
with the comt detennining the value as ofthe date ofthe petition.

This additional statutoxy remedy not only broadens the scope of 1104-a, but
effectively changes its nature from a rifle approach to dissolution to a shotgun
approach to dispute resolution, which can be used to effectuate settlement of a myriad
of shareholder questions.
No Conflict With The Employment

Will Doctrine

New York retains the doctrine of employment at-will by which an employer, in

the absence of an agreement to the contrary, may terminate an employee at any time
for cause or for no cause.28
An imaginative defendant-majority shareholder, in a case now before the
Supreme Court, New York County, In the Matter of The Application of Michael P.
9
Lyons/ asserted as a defense, that the existence of the employment at-will doctrine
precluded the plaintiff-minority shareholder from alleging "oppression" under section
1104-a. In that case, the controlling shareholder swnmarily dismissed the petitionerminority shareholder as an employee and removed him as an officer and director, all
without prior notice or warning. The locks on the doors of the corporation were
changed and the petitioner-minority shareholder was denied compensation. The
theory of the defendant-majority shareholder amoWlted to an argument that because
under New York law, an .employee at-will can be terminated at any time, any
tennination cannot amount to oppression. This defense ignores the gravamen of
section 1104-a. The section does not prohibit the termination of the shareholder·
employee, but rather, it provides a remedy for the oppression of that shareholderemployee. It is not the loss of the employment per se that is central to the spirit of the
statute, but the loss of one's reasonable expectations for one's future under the totality
of the circumstances.

. The courts in New Yotk, weighing the right to terminate an employee against
the nght of that employee to be free from oppression, have addressed the issue in the
form of the relevance of the conduct of the terminated minority shareholder, and have
held: "Whether the Controlling Shareholder discharged petitioner for cause or in their
good business judgment is irrelevant."30
31

In one case, the petitioner-minority shareholder had stolen from the
COiporation. The court, in applying BCL section 1104-a, went as far as to pronounce:
"Even Cain was granted protection from the perpetual vengefulness of his fellow man
(Genesis 4:12-15)... The Court is not without jurisdiction to fashion a remedy here.'m
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In a similar case, the court, applying BCL section 1104-a, cited Top,per-'3 and
held: ".. .'unclean hands' is not an automatic bar..." to relief under BCL section 110434
a.
"Only when a 'minority shareholder whose own acts, made in bad faith and
Wldertaken with a view toward forcing involWltaiy dissolution, give rise to the
complained-of oppression' should relief be barred. "35
In a recent Putnam County case, referred to above, Judge Dickinson was faced
with a petitioner-minority shareholder about whom the controlling shareholder alleged

expense account irregularities, the giving of unauthorized 11gifts," double-billing,
holding himself out as president of the corporation, (which he was not), conducting a
"side business" with his brother-in-law and theft of business. The Court citing
6
Top,per" and similar cases, held: "The...Petitioner may not be prevented from seeking
dissolution merely because he is guilty of one or more of the charges made against
bim."37

Corporate lnfonnalitv Is Not Inconsistent With The Application Of Bel Section 11 04-a
The defendant-majority shareholder, in the Lyons31 case, also defended on the
grounds that the minority shareholder did not have a written employment agreement,
nor did there exist records of the corporation to support the claim of oppression;
presumably on the theory that a corporation operated in less than text book fashion
should be free to oppress its minority shareholders.

The informality with which closely held corporations operate, has long been
held not to bar application of BCL section 11 04-a. On the issue of fonnality, as on the
issue of oppression, the nature of close corporations has been recognized to be
substantially different from large or publicly held corporations.
Professor O'Neal commenting on the application of BCL section 11 04-a states:
''Not uncommonly a participant in a closely held entetprise invests all his assets in the
business with an expectation, often reasonable under the circumstances even in the
absence ofexpress contract, that he will be a key employee in the company and will
have a voice in business decisions" 39 (emphasis added).
The comts in New York have recognized that corporate formalities are
frequently ignored in close corporations. ln finding for the petitioner, it has been
held: nThe parties did not enter into any shareholders' or any other written agreement
with respect to the operation of the Corporation and many organizational
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formalities ...do not seem to have taken place prior to the institution of this
proceeding. "40
"The failure to make [the petitioner] a shareholder until April 1974, merely
reflects the informality with which close corporations are frequently ron and the
informality which [BCL] section 1104-a is intended to remedy41 (emphasis added}
Conclusion
The promulgation of BCL sections 11 04-a and 1118, and court decisions
thereunder, are legislative and judicial recognition that participants in close
be governed by the classic rules applicable to large publicly
corporations should
traded COJPOrations. Special rules apply to shareholders in close co!porations, many of
whom view themselves as partners for the purpose of governance, and as shareholders
for the purpose of enjoying the reiU or imagined benefits of limited liability.
Section 1104-a has provided minority shareholders with a serious weapon-the

threat of involuntary dissolution. In practice, section 1118 has converted section 1104a into a powerful tool to provide an equitable resolution to fundamental problems
between or among shareholders. By application of the two sections, a negotiated
settlement between the minority and the majority_is likely to result.
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Successful plaintiffs under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1976
(hereafter referred to as the ADEAY may recover lost pay from the date of
termination until trial (back pay) plus the pay they would have received from the
date of trial until retirement age (front pay). While courts can easily calculate back
pay, including fringe benefits and interest, it has proven far more difficult to accurately
calculate front pay. A typical description of front pay as "a lump swn representing the
discounted present value of the difference between the earnings an employee would
have received in his old employment and the earnings he can be expected to receive in
his present and future, and by hypothesis inferior, employment"2 requires the court to
speculate about the amount an employee would have received in the future until some
hypothetical retirement date. The difficulty of calculating front pay with any degree of
certll.inty makes such damages an inappropriate remedy in age discrimination cases.
The concept of front pay does not appear in the ADEA itself. The remedies
section simply says that civil actions may be brought "for such legal or equitable relief
as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter," and "legal and equitable relief ...
includes ... without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or
promotion".3 Thus, Congress has given the courts broad authority to fashion remedies
and front pay is the innovative remedial scheme that has emerged. Front pay was first
proposed in law review articles which suggested that the usual remedies were
insufficient to make whole certain workers who had been victims of discrimination.
One author even argued that when reinstatement is not appropriate, the only way to
make a plaintiff whole is with a front pay award.4
·Professor, Southwest Texas State University.

